Abstract. This paper presents a comprehensive formal security framework for key derivation functions (KDF). The major security goal for a KDF is to produce cryptographic keys from a private seed value where the derived cryptographic keys are indistinguishable from random binary strings. We form a framework of five security models for KDFs. This consists of four security models that we propose: Known Public Inputs Attack (KPM, KPS), Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack (CCM) and Adaptive Chosen Public Inputs Attack(CPM); and another security model, previously defined by Krawczyk [6], which we refer to as Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack(CCS). These security models are simulated using an indistinguisibility game. In addition we prove the relationships between these five security models and analyse KDFs using the framework (in the random oracle model).
Introduction
Cryptographic keys are necessary for safeguarding electronic transactions, communications, and data storage. Key derivation functions (KDF) are the standard algorithm used to generate these cryptographic keys. KDFs are used to generate one or more cryptographic keys from a private seed value, such as a password, Diffie-Hellman (DH) shared secret or some non-uniformly random source material [5, 7, 8] . It is critical in the design of security systems that KDF proposals themselves are secure. Significant effort in designing a KDF proposal and comprehensive security analysis to evaluate the proposal is justified. The practical importance of KDFs is reflected in their adoption in industrial standard documents; for example PKCS5 [4] , ISO-18033-2[9] and more recently in NIST 800-135 [3] . There are KDF proposals such as [1, 4, 6 ,10] based on cryptographic hash functions.
In the current literature, formal models for the security analysis of KDFs have been introduced by Yao & Yin in [10] and Krawczyk in [6] . However, there are some limitations with each of these security models as they do not completely cover the range of realistic capabilities of the adversary. This has motivated us to extend the existing security models into a new security framework.
In this paper we develop a comprehensive, formal security framework to form a basis for the design and analysis of KDFs. We begin with an overview of the KDF construction and define the security of KDFs in terms of an indistinguishability game. We develop a framework in which the security can be asserted in terms of the ability of adversaries of varying capabilities to win these indistinguishability games. The adversaries considered range from passive observers of information to active adversaries of varying strength.
Key Derivation Functions
Generally, a key derivation function KDF is defined as
where -PrivS is a private seed. The space of all possible private seeds is denoted by PSPACE and the probability distribution of PrivS is assumed to be public; -s is a salt, a public random string chosen from the salt space SSPACE ; -ctx is a public context string chosen chosen from a context space CSPACE ; -n is a positive integer that indicates the number bits of the to be produced by the KDF; -K is the derived cryptographic key of length n bits.
Note that all inputs are publicly known, except for the secret seed PrivS . The salt is uniformly random and is used to create a large set of possible keys corresponding to a given private seed value. Context information is arbitrary but application specific data; for example, a session identifier or the identities of communicating parties. The basic operation of a KDF is to transform the private seed value and public inputs into an n bit pseudorandom string which can be used as a cryptographic key. The length, n, of the cryptographic key is an application specific security parameter. From now on we will represent the key derivation function as KDF (PrivS , s, ctx ) n .
General Security Framework
The general security framework is based on an indistinguishability game played between a challenger C and an adversary A in polynomial time t, where the KDF is considered secure if no A can win the game with probability significantly greater than the probability of winning by guessing randomly. To win the game A has to determine if the challenge output given in the game is the cryptographic key generated by the KDF or a truly random binary string of the same length within a polynomial number of time steps. The game runs in two major stages: the learning stage and the challenge stage. An optional stage called the adaptive stage may be available for some powerful A, who can repeat the learning stage after receiving the challenge output. An explanation of how this game is conducted follows.
